same year, the equivalent figure for Brazil was $1,780, Mexico's $1,640, and Argentina's $2,230. Between 1962 and 1980, the GNP of Korea (measured in 1980 prices) increased 452 percent averaging 8.5 percent annual growth rate [1] . In terms of the increase in GDP per capita between 1960 and 1985, South Korea ranked sixth among sixty countries [2] .
The literature on Korea's economic miracle has emphasized the crucial role of the "intervention" or "developmental" state not only in mobilizing important economic resources for firms in export-oriented industries but also in actively directing "what, when, and how much to produce." 1 In contrast to such a role for the state in economic development, this paper will examine its role in the protection of workers' health by investigating the historical development of two main state welfare programs: workers' compensation and national health insurance, as the pillars of state policies on workers' health. I will argue that, unlike the state's direct intervention in economic development, the key characteristics of both workers' compensation and national health insurance are the state's minimal organizational and financial costs and the relative autonomy of firm managers. Also, the state first restricted the scope of beneficiaries to the core group of manufacturing and mining workers and then gradually expanded it over a long period of time. I will argue that, despite the economic miracle based on labor intensive industrialization, the Korean state sought to maximize its effort for industrialization and, at the same time, to minimize its costs by restricting the benefits to the workers of core industries first and, yet, forcing workers to pay for a large share of the financial costs.
In this article, I will discuss the historical development of workers' compensation and health insurance. I will examine the basic dimensions of the two programs in terms of the scope of beneficiaries, benefits, financing, and administration. I will argue that the characteristics of the Korean welfare state programs are integrated with the state's strategies for economic development and its relationship with business and labor.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF KOREA'S WELFARE STATE PROGRAMS
The modern form of the state in Korea was forcefully created during the Japanese colonial period from 1910 to 1945. 2 As a colonial state, Korea developed two characteristics that remained after its liberation: a strong police-bureaucratic 82 / PARK 1 A large number of studies on East Asian countries recently have been dedicated to the state's role in economic development. The Korean state and its economic development, in particular, have been focused as the "model" case in the developmental state literature. For the literature, see Johnson [3] , Amsden [4] , Deyo [5] , Evans [6] , Haggard [7] , and Wade [8] . The state's role in welfare development in East Asian countries has been overshadowed by such strong interest in economic development.
apparatus and an interventionist position over civil society. 3 In the medical sector, the colonial state introduced Western medicine and created a Western type medical profession and facilities. Traditional medicine, the official medicine before colonization, completely lost its status. The state also monopolized the education and licensing of the medical profession. It allowed private practices, but state hospitals and public medical practitioners dominated the field of Western medicine. The colonial nature of the state, however, was also revealed in its medical and health policies. Only state officials and their acquaintances could enjoy Western medicine, leaving the rest of the population without the benefits of basic public health. Japan established its first national health insurance in 1922, but it did not establish the same type of program in Korea. It established the Department of Social Affairs under the Ministry of Home Affairs in 1912, which was nominally in charge of poor relief and public health programs. The colonial state established no independent government organizations for public welfare. It was the police department under the Ministry of Home Affairs that administered minimal public health programs such as public sanitation and quarantine for communicable diseases.
The American military government (1945) (1946) (1947) (1948) stepped in after Japan surrendered in 1945. During its temporary rule, the military government launched no new welfare policies to enhance the health of workers and the general population. Its main goal was to maintain the social and political order and to establish the American style social and political infrastructure against North Korea that was ruled by the Russia-backed communist regime. In this period, however, as part of the importation of American institutions, the military government privatized medical institutions and medical professions that were part of the state. The cancellation of the state's support accelerated the decline of public medical institutions and practitioners rapidly in subsequent years. Consequently, such changes paved the way for the dominance of the private medical system that effectively weakened the state's control over the medical infrastructure. At the same time, the military government removed a left-wing labor organization, Chonpyoung, and made the Federation of Korean Trade Union (FKTU, Taehan Nochong) the official labor representative organization to prevent socialists' control over labor unions.
The pro-American and conservative Syng-man Rhee regime (1948) (1949) (1950) (1951) (1952) (1953) (1954) (1955) (1956) (1957) (1958) (1959) (1960) , the First Republic, continued the state's lack of interest in social welfare legislation. Public hospitals and health care facilities, mostly built during the colonial period, deteriorated badly without the state's efforts to renew them. The only development within state organizations regarding health care was the establishment of the Study Group for Introduction of A Health Insurance System under the Bureau of Medical Affairs of the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs in 1959. Although the government did not launch any health insurance legislation, the group published several reports on the possibility of health insurance, the first time the issue was raised.
The Myon Chang regime (1960) (1961) came to power after the April 19th student uprising in 1960. While the Chang regime, the Second Republic, relied heavily on foreign aid, it did not create a social welfare system except for a pension plan for civil servants. A small number of officials and researchers in the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs recommended establishment of the "Social Security Committee," a research organization to study the issues of a social welfare system. The state passed a series of legislation that mainly targeted the welfare of government employees first and then a special segment of the population. 4 However, the military coup by Chung-hee Park overthrew the Chang regime before it established social welfare systems for workers and the public. The coup leaders created the Supreme Council for National Reconstruction (SCNR) and ruled the country as a supra-legal authority until Chung-hee Park ran for election and became the first president of the Third Republic. It was during the SCNR period that Korea passed its first welfare legislation for workers including its first voluntary health insurance act with workers' compensation in 1963. In this article, I will examine the history and characteristics of workers' compensation and then those of national health insurance.
WORKERS' COMPENSATION AND NATIONAL HEALTH INSURANCE

Workers' Compensation
Before the state passed compulsory workers' compensation legislation in 1963, workers' only legal recourse for work-related death or injuries was to file a lawsuit for compensation against their companies at the civil law courts (the Civil Law Article 750). 5 Since compensation under the Civil Law required proof of willful wrongdoing or fault by the defendants, which was hard to do, workers often received no compensation at all. Even when workers successfully proved wrong intentions and responsibility on the part of the employer, it frequently took substantial time and legal costs to receive actual compensation, which discouraged many workers from filing a lawsuit in the first place. As a result, a new compensation law based on the Labor Standard Law was created. But with the new law, workers still could not receive compensation when employers did not have financial resources and went bankrupt due to a large-scale industrial accident. Consequently, the state established a new workers' compensation system under the Industrial Accidents Insurance Act of December 16, 1963 . According to the new workers' compensation insurance, the state as an insurer required firms over a certain size (initially, firms with 500 or more employees in manufacturing and mining industries) to insure against work-related injuries and casualties. The idea was to spread out the financial responsibilities of individual firms and, thereby, to guarantee appropriate compensation for injured or killed workers. The Korean state, however, still maintains a dual system in which workers are covered by both workers' compensation and the Labor Standard Law. It is the seriousness of accidents that determines which law-workers' compensation or the Labor Standard Law-would be applied for compensation. Although the state continued to revise workers' compensation as recently as 1991, expanding the scope of beneficiaries, the key characteristics of the system are as follows.
a. Scope of Beneficiaries
As the first welfare state program, workers' compensation represents the strategies of the Korean state and, consequently, the common characteristics of the Korean welfare state programs that were replicated in the following welfare state programs, including national health insurance. Workers' compensation started as and still is first and foremost for workers. In 1964, its first year of application, compensation covered employees in workplaces with more than 500 workers in mining and manufacturing industries. That amounted to only 81,789 employees (about 1.05% of all employees at the time) in sixty-four workplaces or companies. Table 1 summarizes the subsequent expansion of the scope of beneficiaries since 1964.
Workers' compensation targeted a small number of firms in leading industries that were central for the state's export-oriented economic development plans. The list of industries suggests that economic development and workers' compensation were not separate, but integral parts of the state's strategies: the state sought to protect workers in export-related industries first to minimize the financial and organizational burdens of the state and business firms. Thus, the basic principle of the Korean welfare state programs was established in its first welfare state program.
b. Benefits
Benefits are paid to workers who are injured, sick, disabled, or killed due to work-related activities. The types of benefits include case benefits for medical treatment, loss of working days, disability, family members of deceased workers, long-term illness, and funeral expenses. The cash benefits for medical treatment cover the entire cost of medical treatment unless the illness of a worker lasts less than three days. For such a short-term illness, employers pay the medical costs directly to workers, in accordance with the Labor Standard Law. When a worker is not able to perform his or her work due to work-related injuries for more than three days, he or she would be paid 70 percent of the average daily wage during the period of injuries. When the period is less than three days, employers pay cash benefits directly, according to the Labor Standard Law. When a worker is handicapped or disabled permanently by injuries or illness due to work-related activities, he or she would receive cash benefits to compensate for the loss of income. The types of disabilities are classified into fourteen levels and 133 categories. Also, disability benefits are distinguished between a lump sum payment and a pension. The pension would be paid for the lifetime of a disabled worker, and when a disabled worker dies before the total paid amount of pension is smaller than a lump sum payment, the difference would be paid in a lump sum to his or her family members. When a worker dies due to work-related activities, his or her family members would be paid either a pension or a lump sum. When a worker does not recover from a work-related injury or illness after two years of medical treatment, he or she would be paid cash benefits for a long-term illness or injury in addition to cash benefits for medical treatment. Finally, the family members of a deceased worker would be paid for funeral expenses.
The cash benefits paid for workers' compensation continued to increase, which may have resulted either from the expansion of coverage or from the number and seriousness of work-related accidents and diseases. For example, in 1986, the 86 / PARK amount of cash benefit was 214,730 Won and there were 526,961 cases. In 1990, the equivalent figures were 539,351 Won and 802,872 cases [12] . For 1986-1990, the single biggest type of benefits paid was cash benefits for medical treatment, which amounted to about 30 percent of the total. The next most frequent awards included benefits for loss of working days, disability, family, and funeral in descending order [13] .
c. Financing
Based on the principle of no-fault responsibility of employers, employers finance the total costs of workers' compensation except the administrative costs which are subsidized by the state. Each employer pays his or her share of insurance premiums that is calculated by multiplying the total wages of each workplace by insurance premium rates from each industry. At the same time, as a device to promote the efforts of employers to enhance work environments, the state applied the insurance premium rates that reflected accident rates of individual workplaces, instead of industry-wide ones, to an increasing number of workplaces. In 1990, such individual rates were applied to 11,026 workplaces. The workers' compensation fund, however, has experienced a substantial amount of surplus since its early periods. In 1964, the surplus rate was 33. 3 [14] . Due to a recent high surplus rate in workers' compensation, employers and workers claimed that either the insurance premium rate should be lowered or the scope and amount of benefits should be raised.
d. Administration
From the beginning, the state directly administered workers' compensation. Initially, the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs was responsible for the overall supervision of the workers' compensation system, but it was transferred to the Ministry of Labor Affairs. Within that ministry, the Bureau of Labor Insurance and forty-four local branch offices were established for workers' compensation. The Labor Welfare Public Corporation was established to promote the welfare of workers who suffer from industrial accidents. The corporation directly runs a number of rehabilitation facilities and special hospitals for industrial accident victims. The state officials oversee workplaces to assure that industrial accidents or illness are reported and workers are properly compensated and treated according to the law. Particularly, as the state sought to apply insurance premium rates based on the safety records of each workplace, the state put more emphasis on the task of monitoring the accuracy of workplace records.
National Health Insurance
Following is the chronological evolution of the Korean national health insurance since the state launched its first voluntary health insurance in 1963 (see Table 2 ). Table 2 shows two trends in the development of Korea's health insurance system: a shift from voluntary to compulsory participation and expansion in coverage and benefits. Among the legislative events, two major ones are the 1963 Voluntary Health Insurance Act and the 1976 National Health Insurance Act. I will explain briefly the characteristics of the two pieces of legislation and the health insurance based on them.
a. Voluntary Health Insurance Act of 1963
After the military coup on May 16, 1961, its leaders established the SCNR to control the administrative, legislative, and judiciary functions of the state. Chung-hee Park, the leader of the coup, became the chair of the SCNR. On January 13, 1962, the SCNR announced the Five-Year Economic Development Plan with a strong emphasis on the state's role in economic development based on heavy industries, agriculture, and an import substitution strategy. The plan, however, did not discuss welfare issues. State managers became interested in social welfare as a result of the establishment of the Social Security Council and the Seminar for Social Security on July 28, 1962. Sohn argues that such change was possible by the former members of the Study Group for the Introduction of A Health Insurance System, who persistently persuaded the members of the SCNR about the necessity of a social welfare system along with economic development [16] . The military government announced a plan for the creation of health insurance in the Seoul Daily newspaper on February 11, 1963.
The members of the SCNR in its 107th Standing Committee on December 16, 1963, passed three welfare bills: the Basic Law for Social Security, the Industrial Accidents Insurance Act, and the Voluntary Health Insurance Act. The members of the SSC drafted the health insurance act. 6 The original bill proposed compulsory health insurance for workers in workplaces with 500 workers or more, but during the legislative session a legal counsel of the SCNR argued that compulsory insurance would violate the freedom of contracts in the constitution by forcing companies and workers to join the proposed health insurance. Consequently, the SCNR changed its original bill from compulsory to voluntary health insurance which also included the following characteristics: an insurance co-op, not a government agency, as the administrative agency and insurer (Article 12); benefits include out-patient and hospitalization, funeral, and maternity care (Article 28); state subsidies for full administrative costs and partial costs of insurance benefits (Article 43); 3 to 8 percent of monthly income of workers as insurance (1) The new health insurance legislation launched a dual system: first, compulsory health insurance for employees and their dependents in firms with 500 workers or more; second, voluntary health insurance for employees and their dependents in firms with fewer than 500 workers and those who wanted to join.
(2) State-run medical aid for low-income workers and their dependents under a public assistance scheme. As complementary legislation to its health insurance for workers, a separate compulsory health insurance for government officials, public and private school teachers, and their dependents was launched. The compulsory coverage of health insurance extended to include workplaces with 300 workers or more. The dependents of military personnel insured. Pensioners (retired government officials and military personnel) insured. The compulsory coverage of health insurance extended to include workplaces with 100 workers or more. Regional health insurance programs introduced in three rural areas as a pilot project. 15 voluntary occupational health insurance programs introduced for the self-employed (owners of barber shops, beauty parlors, and so forth). Regional health insurance programs extended to two more rural areas and one city area as a pilot project. Compulsory coverage extended to include workplaces with 16 workers or more. A pilot health insurance program in two rural areas introduced to include Oriental medicine as part of benefits covered. Oriental medicine included as part of benefits nationwide. A compulsory regional health insurance program launched for rural residents (self-employed, farmers, fishermen, and their dependents). The compulsory coverage extended to include workplaces with 5 workers or more. A compulsory regional health insurance program includes urban residents (self-employed and their dependents). Benefits include dispensed drugs at pharmacies. premium rates (Article 44); and employers and the insured pay 50 percent of the premium respectively (Article 45). 7 Voluntary health insurance, however, failed since only a handful of pilot programs were established in the next 15 years until the state legislated compulsory health insurance in 1976.
b. The Compulsory Health Insurance Act of 1976
In August 1970, the National Assembly passed the first revised health insurance act. The main revision was to change voluntary participation to compulsory participation. The 1970 act, however, was never implemented because the administration and the National Assembly did not pass administrative decrees. Thus, compulsory state health insurance was legislated, but it remained merely on paper. Why was the 1970 act not implemented? During the regular session of the 1971 National Assembly, the minister of Health and Social Affairs stated that compulsory state health insurance was not established because it would require major improvement in national income, the state's finances, and medical systems. It can be inferred that the administration did not implement the 1970 act because of its concern about its capacity to administer the insurance.
The second revised health insurance act passed in 1976. The main characteristics of the act were: it is compulsory to establish a health insurance co-op as the insurer in each workplace with 500 or more employees and each industrial complex (Article 4). 8 Health Insurance co-ops in workplaces are self-governing insurers and run by their own management committees. An employer selects one-half of the committee members among the insured (that is, employees), and the insured elect the other half among the insured (Article 18 and 19 ). An employer, however, selects the head of the committee among the committee members whom the employer also selects (Article 26), which is likely to secure the employer's control of the committee. Its financing scheme remains the same as in the previous legislation: employers and employees share the contribution to insurance premiums equally and the state subsidizes only part of the administrative costs (Article 36). To standardize monthly income for calculating the employees' contribution, the act proposed a standard monthly income system where a whole range of monthly income would be divided into thirty levels. Then, the percentage of monthly income as a contribution, ranging from 3 percent to 8 percent, would be calculated based on standardized income levels. For example, monthly income below 37,500 Won would belong to the first level, where standardized monthly income would be counted as 35,000 Won. Therefore, if 5 percent is chosen, an employee whose income is at the first level would pay 5 percent of 35,000 Won, that is 1,750 Won, as a monthly contribution. Also, 90 / PARK 7 For a legislative process, see Sohn [18, pp. 64-65]. 8 For the entire contents of the legislation, see Choi [19, pp. 425-436] .
the insured make a co-payment in addition to their insurance premiums, which is 20 percent of medical expenses per treatment for the insured and 40 percent for dependents (Article 34). No state's contributions to insurance premiums resulted in an amazingly high share of individuals' co-payment in the national health expenditures (for example, individuals' share was 79%, insurance benefits 4%, and government's share 17% in the 1977 gross national health expenditure). Table 3 indicates that the health insurance programs covered-both the insured and their dependents-only 0.19 percent of the total population prior to 1977.
i. Scope of Beneficiaries-
Since state compulsory health insurance only started in 1977, I argue that the coverage prior to 1977 includes only private health insurance programs. The impact of the 1976 act is clearly indicated by the fact that the coverage rate increased by forty-six times between 1976 and 1977. The small coverage rate prior to 1977 suggests that pre-existing business health insurance programs were relatively insignificant in terms of their costs throughout all industries. This is more evident in Table 4 focusing on the insured alone. Even if we assume that all those insured had their insurance from their employers, only 8.1 percent of the employed had insurance coverage. The impact of the 1976 act is, again, clear by the big jump in the coverage rate to 9.3 percent in 1977. As Table 4 indicates, state health insurance, like workers' compensation, was applied to only a small percentage of workers (those working in companies with 500 workers or more) and then gradually expanded its scope of beneficiaries. If state health insurance was established to help low-income workers and their families to cope with illness and associated financial problems, it should have been applied first to workers in smaller firms, who often received lower wages compared with their colleagues in larger firms. Instead, the fact that state health insurance covered the workers in the larger firms first and only slowly expanded its coverage to less affluent workers in subsequent periods suggests that the Korean welfare state programs incorporated workers that formed a core labor market and, thus, segmented workers in terms of welfare benefits based on their positions in the labor market. Considering that those companies with 500 workers or more mostly belonged to Chaebol, Korean conglomerates, the Korean state welfare programs only reinforced wage gaps between workers in Chaebol firms and those in non Chaebol firms. ii. Benefits-The benefits are divided into two parts: medical services and cash benefits. Medical services include treatment, delivery, and diagnosis. Cash benefits include fees for treatment when beneficiaries cannot receive services at medical facilities or pharmacies appointed by insurers. Cash benefits also include delivery fees when beneficiaries give birth at home and funeral expenses. Cash benefits, however, do not compensate for lost income due to illness. Medical services form a majority of the benefits provided by Korean health insurance.
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iii. Financing-The Korean state health insurance is entirely financed by employers and employees except for the administrative costs which are subsidized by the state. The lack of contribution by the state to health insurance costs is revealed by the annual budget share of the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs, the government ministry in charge of health insurance, as a percentage of the total governmental budget (see Figure 1 ).
The share of the MHSA in the governmental budget declined from 2.69 percent to 1.83 percent between 1975 and 1976 and only slightly increased from 1.83 percent to 1.94 percent between 1976 and 1977. It again declined from 1.94 percent to 1.89 percent between 1977 and 1978. If the state contributed substantially to the financing of state health insurance, it would be expected that the share of the MHSA budget would have increased. Such data reveal that the state succeeded in launching its major welfare program without incurring serious financial cost. The nature of the state's involvement in health care also is revealed in Table 5 .
In Table 5 , individuals' out-of-pocket expenses clearly dominated insurance benefits and the government's share even after the 1976 act, so much so that it is even doubtful whether we can call the Korean national health insurance a welfare state program. The consequence of the 1976 act was to reduce the burden on the state, not on individuals. Although the share of individuals' out-of-pocket expenses decreased slightly, the share of insurance benefits paid by both employers and employees equally increased at the same time. The small share of the state is even more dramatic, considering that its share in this figure includes public health expenditures and that the coverage of health insurance expanded to workplaces with 300 employees or more in the third revision of the health insurance act in 1979. Table 6 shows that governmental expenditure on health in particular and its share of GNP often ranked last in welfare prior to the 1976 act. Even within social welfare expenditures, health was the lowest.
Since the American military government imported its market-oriented medical system, the Korean state withdrew its strong presence from the medical sector. As a result, Korea experienced a dramatic decline in public medical facilities and medical practitioners in contrast to an equally dramatic rise in private facilities and practitioners. Table 7 shows that the participation of the state in medical care-indicated by the relative share of public and private sectors in medical care, the number of medical facilities and practitioners-was still low in 1977 compared with private medical practitioners and facilities: the public sector was responsible for about one-fourth of the private sector's share in medical care; the number of practitioners in the public sector was about one-third of those in the private sector; the number of facilities about one-sixth; the number of hospital beds about one-third. If the private sector dominated the public sector in terms of the number of personnel and facilities, similar dominance also appears in the amount of money both sectors spent on health care. the health insurance act of 1976. This is, however, a relatively small change, suggesting that the state had only a minimal role in the scheme. Within the private sector, what stands out the most is the absolute dominance of individuals in the expenditures compared with the business subsidy. This reveals the absence not only of state expenditures compared with the business subsidy. This reveals the absence not only of state welfare but also of business welfare: individuals, without state or business subsidy, paid for 86 percent of the national health expenditures from 1970 to 1977. From 1976 to 1977, a 3 percent decrease of individuals' relative share with an equivalent increase in the state's share again points to the small impact of the 1976 act. Such historical institutionalization of private dominance in the medical sector suggests that the state would have difficulties in establishing and maintaining a state-run or statecontrolled health insurance scheme in Korea, since the state would not have a strong channel of influence on private medical practitioners and medical facilities.
iv. Administration-According to the 1976 health insurance act, the state did not participate in the administration of health insurance. Instead, it delegated administrative control over the health insurance of workers to health insurance co-ops that were established in each workplace. In contrast with its role in economic development, therefore, the state minimized its control in favor of the autonomy of firm managers in health insurance. According to the law, each health insurance co-op establishes a health insurance committee that consists of equal numbers of representatives of both employers and employees. However, since only the representatives of employers can chair the committee and thus have final decision-making power, it can be argued that the control of state health insurance is delegated to the employers and managers of private business. Both workers' compensation and health insurance form the core of state programs for workers' health. Both programs have the following common characteristics. First, the Korean welfare state programs for workers' health were particularistic not universal. Initially, they excluded not only part of the population (for example, the self-employed), but also targeted only some of the workers who belonged to the core set of workers, based on their firm size, who were crucial for the state's economic development plans. It can be argued that the state strategies for welfare provision and economic development were not separate, but were closely integrated under the overall goal of economic growth and labor control. When the state considered economic development as the best way to enhance its political legitimacy, its main goal for state welfare programs was not to compromise but to promote economic development by offering benefits first to a core set of workers who were crucial for export industries.
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By establishing state welfare programs that fragmented workers into two groups based on their positions in the labor market, the state could achieve several things: minimizing the financial and organizational burden on the state itself and small companies, appealing to the workers in big firms with new benefits, and dividing workers between large and small firms in terms of benefits as well as wages, thus reinforcing a segmented labor market. If the main goal of state welfare programs was to protect low-income workers and their families, they are the ones who should have been covered first, not those working in large companies whose wages tend to be higher.
Secondly, the development of welfare state programs was gradual. The gradual expansion suggests that the state sought to minimize the organizational and financial burden on the state and firms by incrementally expanding the scope of beneficiaries.
Third, in the same context, the state made sure that it would not pay for both programs.
Fourth, unlike its micro-level intervention in economic development, the state delegated administrative control over both welfare state programs to the managers of firms and maintained only supervisory functions over the programs.
In sum, the common characteristics of both welfare state programs for workers' health suggest that it is important to understand the state's strategies in welfare provision with a close connection to its strategies for economic development. Like other countries, the state first established workers' compensation, a welfare state program that is the most directly tied to the health of workers. More than ten years later, the state launched state health insurance, and that was strictly for the core group of workers in the manufacturing and mining industries. Thus, the pace, scope, and state's role indicate that the main strategies of the state in welfare provision were to accommodate its goals in economic development by providing benefits to the core group of workers and by delegating administrative control to firm managers and to minimize its organizational and financial costs.
IMPLICATIONS FOR WORKERS' HEALTH
This study of both workers' compensation and national health insurance reveals that the state sought to minimize its control and delegated the majority of control to firm managers, thereby robbing workers of opportunities or channels to influence the way their health and welfare are secured and protected from industrial accidents and illness. Particularly, weak protection against various kinds of occupational illnesses that newly emerge from polluted and dangerous work environments put workers into new kinds of danger. Lack of efforts to list new types of occupational illness and insufficient special medical and rehabilitation facilities are increasing the inadequacy of the present system. The fact that the biggest share of cash benefits within workers' compensation is paid to medical treatment suggests that strong efforts to cover occupational diseases are necessary for efficient fiscal administration of the system.
Also, workers' compensation should include all workers regardless of the size of their companies. The lack of coverage of compensation for workers in small companies (those with five or fewer workers) is problematic since such small-scale workplaces are the ones that are least likely to provide safety features for their workers due to lack of financial resources. A substantially high percentage of individual co-payment for health insurance threatens the Korean national health insurance as an equitable social welfare for low-income workers and their families. The fact that all Korean welfare state programs were established for the workers in relatively big companies and only gradually expanded to those in smaller companies reveals that they were not created for the welfare of workers first but for the functioning of economic production that is crucial for export industries.
To enhance the state's contribution to workers' health through its welfare state programs, the present study suggests the following:
• First, the state should continue to elaborate and expand the scope of occupational illnesses and environmental hazards that workers' compensation covers;
• Second, the state should expand the scope of workers' compensation to include all workers regardless of the size of their workplace;
• Third, for both workers' compensation and health insurance, the state should seek to provide workers an organizational channel by which they can control the overall administration of the programs along with other labor matters.
• Finally, for both programs the state should reduce the financial costs to individual workers in order to maximize social justice and the equity of the programs.
